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Tropical developing countriesAttention to tenure is a fundamental step in preparation for REDD+ implementation. Unclear and conflict-
ing tenure has been the main challenge faced by the proponents of subnational REDD+ initiatives, and
accordingly, they have expended much effort to remedy the problem. This article assesses how well
REDD+ has performed in laying an appropriate tenure foundation. Field research was carried out in
two phases (2010–2012 and 2013–2014) in five countries (Brazil, Peru, Cameroon, Tanzania,
Indonesia) at 21 subnational initiatives, 141 villages (half targeted for REDD+ interventions), and
3,754 households. Three questions are posed: 1) What was the effect of REDD+ on perceived tenure inse-
curity of village residents?; 2) What are the main reasons for change in the level of tenure insecurity and
security from Phase 1 to Phase 2 perceived by village residents in control and intervention villages?; and
3) How do intervention village residents evaluate the impact of tenure-related interventions on commu-
nity well-being? Among the notable findings are that: 1) tenure insecurity decreases slightly across the
whole sample of villages, but we only find that REDD+ significantly reduces tenure insecurity in
Cameroon, while actually increasing insecurity of smallholder agricultural land tenure in Brazil at the
household level; 2) among the main reported reasons for increasing tenure insecurity (where it occurs)
are problems with outside companies, lack of title, and competition from neighboring villagers; and 3)
views on the effect of REDD+ tenure-related interventions on community well-being lean towards the
positive, including for interventions that restrain access to forest. Thus, while there is little evidence that
REDD+ interventions have worsened smallholder tenure insecurity (as feared by critics), there is also lit-
tle evidence that the proponents’ efforts to address tenure insecurity have produced results. Work on
tenure remains an urgent priority for safeguarding local livelihoods as well as for reducing deforestation.
This will require increased attention to participatory engagement, improved reward systems, tenure pol-
icy reform, integration of national and local efforts, and ‘‘business-as-usual” interests.
 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction deforestation, and forest degradation accounting for 12% of annualLand use and land cover change in the tropics figures promi-
nently in the climate change threat, with agricultural growth,greenhouse gas emissions (Smith, Bustamante, 2014), and corre-
sponding loss of the capacity of forests to absorb atmospheric car-
bon (Goodman & Herold, 2014). Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), first introduced at
COP 11 in 2005, has been viewed as the leading option for climate
change mitigation in the forest sector. The key innovation in REDD+
was to create conditional, performance-based incentives for pre-
venting forest conversion (REDD) and for enhancing forest carbon
stocks (the ‘‘+”). In so doing, it has been hoped that REDD+ would
1 Proponent organizations are responsible for initiating and implementing REDD+
on the ground. In our sample 11 are private nonprofit, four are private for-profit, two
are private nonprofit/government, two are government, one is public bilateral, and
one is a government-to-government partnership. Sixteen are at the project scale and
five at the jurisdictional scale (Sills et al., 2014:490–493).
2 For information on the Saweto Dedicated Grant Mechanism in Peru see: http:/
www.worldbank.org/projects/P148499?lang=en.
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ously estimated at $5 to $60 billion annually (Angelsen, 2013;
Morris & Stevens, 2011; Stern, 2006).
REDD+ has grown rapidly, with readiness activities in 55 coun-
tries and 351 subnational initiatives underway and active as of
2014 (Simonet, Karsenty, Newton, de Perthuis, Schaap, & Seyller,
2015). This rapid growth belies considerable difficulty in REDD+
developing as planned and meeting its objectives. The conditional,
performance-based incentives intended in REDD+ have so far
barely materialized, and subnational initiatives are essentially
functioning as integrated conservation and development projects
(ICDPs), the approach to controlling deforestation that precedes
REDD+ and that did not make substantial progress (Sunderlin &
Sills, 2012). Subnational initiatives have so far generated a small
amount of carbon offsets (Peters-Stanley, Gonzalez, Yin, with
Goldstein, & Hamrick, 2013:vii, ix), with only 26% selling forest car-
bon credits as of 2014 (Simonet et al., 2015). REDD+ was to have
been capitalized through public funds in the initial years and then
by the private market through forest carbon offsets, but with the
failure of the global carbon market to materialize, REDD+ continues
to be almost wholly publicly-funded (Norman & Nakhooda, 2014).
REDD+ has failed to advance as planned not just because of finan-
cial difficulties, but more fundamentally (and relatedly) because
‘‘business as usual” (BAU) interests – those tied to the conversion
of forests to non-forest uses – continue to be hegemonic in forest
land-use decision-making (Brockhaus, Di Gregorio, & Mardiah,
2014; Edwards, Koh, & Laurance, 2011; Enrici & Hubacek, 2016;
Sunderlin, Pratama, et al., 2014: 17).
The Paris Climate Agreement reached at COP 21 in December
2015 has invigorated attention to the need for climate change mit-
igation in national policies worldwide (Day et al., 2015). The forest
sector has a prominent place in the Paris Agreement, with many
countries having identified REDD+ as an integral part of their
Nationally-Determined Contributions (NDCs) toward climate
change mitigation (Harris & Stolle, 2016; Keenan, 2016; Leonard,
2016; World Bank, 2015). Consequently, it is likely that REDD+ will
experience a boost and revival.
Clarification of tenure arrangements and improvement of
tenure security for local stakeholders have been widely recog-
nized as priorities for fulfilling REDD+ in a way that is effective,
efficient, and equitable (Cotula & Mayers, 2009: v; Sunderlin
et al., 2009; Day & Naughton-Treves, 2012: 7-8; Doherty &
Schroeder, 2011: 82; Westholm, Biddulph, Hellmark, & Ekbom,
2011: 1; Rothe & Munro-Faure, 2013: 1; UN-REDD Programme,
2013). Attention to tenure is essential not only for fulfilling the
goals of REDD+, but also other land-based climate mitigation
approaches such as green economy (FAO, 2012), low emissions
development strategies (Fishbein & Lee, 2015: 19), ‘‘rights alone
are sufficient” approaches (Hatcher, 2009: 11; Stevens,
Winterbottom, Springer, & Reytar, 2014: 1-3), and climate change
adaptation (Quan & Dyer, 2008: 3).
Empirical research has documented the challenges faced by
proponents in addressing tenure (Awono, Tambe, Owona, &
Barreau, 2014; Dokken, Caplow, Angelsen, & Sunderlin, 2014;
Duchelle et al., 2014; Larson et al., 2013; Naughton-Treves &
Day, 2012; Resosudarmo, Atmadja, et al., 2014; Sunderlin, Larson,
et al., 2014). Interviews with representatives of proponent organi-
zations showed tenure is the single most difficult challenge in
establishing REDD+ on the ground when ranked against all chal-
lenges (Sunderlin, Ekaputri, et al., 2014). Resolving tenure
insecurity is difficult for a variety of reasons, ranging from
problems like cost, poor data and capacity to more complex
social, economic and political problems involving overlapping
claims, conflict and widely divergent interests and goals
(Larson et al., 2013). Fundamentally, current forest tenure condi-
tions in most tropical countries tend to favor the prerogatives ofBAU interests at the expense of local stakeholders. This imbalance
and the contested nature of tropical forests is a contemporary
manifestation of formal state appropriation of forests centuries
ago, and states giving privileged access to forest lands and
resources to economically and politically powerful actors (Kelly &
Peluso, 2015; Peluso, 1992). The process has left many forest peo-
ples feeling like trespassers in their own homes. Grassroots move-
ments, especially indigenous organizations, have been
instrumental in efforts to assert customary tenure claims over
and against statutory tenure and have won important battles,
especially in Latin America (Roldan, 2004), and more recently in
India (Springate-Baginsky et al., 2009) and Indonesia (Kahurani,
Sirait, van Noordwijk, & Pradhan, 2013). Nevertheless, and
although a process of devolution of forest rights has been under-
way for four decades, progress has been uneven among countries
and in most cases has not fundamentally altered the relations of
power and authority over the control of forest lands (RRI, 2014;
RRI, 2015).
Early action on forest tenure serves five vital functions in fulfill-
ment of the goals of REDD+: identification of the right holders to
REDD+ rewards; mitigation of potential harm from restricting for-
est access and competition for REDD+ benefits; introduction or bol-
stering of community forestry; provision or assurance of
enforceable rights of exclusion; and resolution of inter-sectoral
and inter-ministerial tenure contestation at all scales (Sunderlin,
2014).
In many tropical countries, proponent organizations1 have
become de facto the lead implementers of tenure preparations in
REDD+, for three reasons. First, as initiators and implementers they
are the ones able to ‘‘read” the socioeconomic, political, and environ-
mental conditions at the local level and plan how to match them to
project goals (ideally in collaboration with local stakeholders). Sec-
ond, by default they tend to be the main actors because of the
absence of coordinated national-level action (e.g. forest tenure
reform) to create appropriate tenure conditions. Third, they have
the incentive to address tenure issues in order to capture and man-
age carbon funds. These tenure-related interventions include not
only clarifying and securing tenure rights (enabling conditions likely
to be viewed positively by local stakeholders), but also, in many
cases, the implementation of restrictions on forest access and con-
version (disincentives that one suspects would run counter to the
livelihood interests of local stakeholders).
REDD+ has clearly influenced the attention given to local tenure
rights globally, but it is not yet clear to what extent it has led to sig-
nificant change on the ground. On the positive side, REDD+ has
helped motivate national-level sorting out of overlapping forest
claims through a ‘‘One Map Policy” (Resosudarmo, Oka, & Utomo,
2014; Samadhi, 2013) in Indonesia. In Brazil, linkage between
promoting environmental compliance and securing land tenure
rights is potentially a powerful instrument for early action
(Duchelle et al., 2014). In Peru, one of the most significant develop-
ments to date is a World Bank project negotiated and prepared
directly with indigenous leaders: the Saweto Dedicated Grant
Mechanism for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities under
the Forest Investment Program (FIP). This $5.5 million project
includes funds for the recognition of 310 native communities and
demarcation and titling of almost 1 million hectares of native
lands.2 Across the tropics, grassroots concerns over REDD+ gave/
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international dialogue among multilateral and bilateral REDD+ pro-
ponents and indigenous organizations.
Multi-country field research has shown that almost all propo-
nents of subnational REDD+ initiatives are seriously engaged in
tenure clarifications (de Sassi et al., 2014:425; Sunderlin, Larson,
et al., 2014). Proponents are motivated not just by a means-end
logic (recognizing the way tenure clarification serves REDD+ effec-
tiveness and efficiency) but also by ethical concerns (Sunderlin,
Ekaputri, et al., 2014: 19).
On the negative side, national governments have not given suf-
ficient attention to tenure in readiness activities (Davis, Daviet,
Nakhooda, & Thualt, 2009; Williams, 2013), in the Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) filed for COP 21
(RRI, 2016a: 3–4) and in specific Emissions Reductions plans (ER-
PINs) such as those prepared for the Forest Carbon Partnership
Facility (RRI, 2016b). Implementation of Indonesia’s constitutional
decisions favoring indigenous forest tenure rights has been slow,
and uneven. In many countries proponents try to resolve at the
local level tenure challenges whose origin and scope are far beyond
the borders of their site; without government collaboration or sup-
port, they have a mixed record in attempting to establish an appro-
priate tenure foundation (Sunderlin, Larson, et al., 2014).
This article presents the results of field research conducted at
two periods in time (Phase 1 in 2010–2012 and Phase 2 in 2013–
2014) in five countries at 21 subnational initiative sites, encom-
passing 142 villages and 3754 households (roughly half the villages
and households are control and half are intervention).
The overarching research question in this article is: What
impact did REDD+ 3 have on the insecurity of tenure rights for local
stakeholders? There are three subordinate questions: What was the
effect of REDD+ on perceived tenure insecurity of village residents?;
What are the main reasons for change in the level of tenure insecu-
rity and security from Phase 1 to Phase 2 perceived by village resi-
dents in control and intervention villages?; How do intervention
village residents evaluate the impact of tenure-related interventions
on community well-being?
With respect to the first question, we estimate the impact of
REDD+ as the impact of living in a village selected for the REDD+
intervention area. We hypothesize that tenure insecurity will
decrease more for households in intervention villages due to the
concerted effort by REDD+ proponent organizations to improve
tenure. With respect to the second question, we hypothesize that
external claims on local forests will be the main reason for worsen-
ing tenure insecurity and REDD+ will be the main reason for
improving tenure security. With respect to the third question, we
hypothesize that local stakeholders perceive that interventions
intended to clarify tenure have increased the well-being of the
community, and interventions intended to restrict forest access
and conversion have decreased the well-being of the community.
The article contains the following subsequent sections: meth-
ods; results (answers to the three subordinate questions); discus-3 In this article we are measuring the impact of REDD+, rather than specific REDD+
interventions. Our question is whether and how implementation of forest conserva-
tion interventions in the context of REDD+, which has placed a relatively strong
emphasis on conditional performance-based incentives and the associated require-
ments for tenure clarification, has affected use of forest land and well-being among
smallholders. That is, we are interested in the impact of the bundle of interventions
implemented in the name of REDD+ by proponent organizations. We hypothesize that
REDD+ might have an impact on tenure security specifically, because of its emphasis
on conditionality, the requirement for Free Prior and Informed Consent, and large
investments in ‘‘readiness”. In addition to looking at overall impact, we assess the
incidence of specific interventions related to tenure clarification and tenure enforce-
ment and village and household perceptions of their effects. One caveat is that while
the proponents of all of the initiatives were using the REDD+ label and intending to
reduce net forest carbon emissions in a quantifiable way at the time of the baseline
survey, several of them had shifted strategies by the time of the phase 2 research.sion, with a focus on comparison and contrast of results among
countries, and an answer to the overarching question; conclusion
and recommendations.2. Methods
The field research reported in this article was carried out by
CIFOR’s Global Comparative Study on REDD+ (GCS) on subnational
REDD+ initiatives. The aim of this research component of GCS has
been to evaluate the implementation of subnational REDD+ in
terms of the 3E + criteria (effectiveness, efficiency, equity and co-
benefits [well-being, secure tenure, biodiversity], see http://
www.cifor.org/gcs/modules/redd-subnational-initiatives/). The
research was designed to support quasi-experimental impact eval-
uation based on ‘‘before-after/control-intervention” (BACI) data
from villages and households (Sunderlin et al., 2016). This experi-
mental design has been recommended for rigorous impact evalua-
tion of conservation and development interventions based on
counterfactual analysis (Jagger et al., 2009; Jagger et al., 2010).
However, concerns have also been raised about counterfactual
analysis and the underlying potential outcomes framework for
understanding causality (Scriven, 2008; Westhorp, 2014; White,
2009; White, 2014). Thus, we draw on both the BACI data for coun-
terfactual analysis, and local perceptions of the drivers of observed
changes and the effects of REDD+ activities.
The research reported in this article was conducted at 21 subna-
tional initiative sites in Brazil, Peru, Cameroon, Tanzania, and
Indonesia (Fig. 1, Annex 1).4 These five countries were selected pur-
posively to include two countries each in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America; key tropical forest countries (e.g. Brazil, Indonesia); and
high numbers of REDD+ initiatives (Brazil, Peru, Indonesia). We also
sought countries with sufficiently stable governance for productive
research, and strong donor support for REDD+ (e.g. Government of
Norway funding for Brazil, Tanzania, Indonesia) (Sunderlin et al.,
2016: 17-19). The initiatives were selected purposively on the basis
of six criteria, including: (1) conformity to our operational definition
of ‘‘REDD+” (i.e. aiming to get most of their carbon benefits from
avoided deforestation and degradation or forest conservation/restora
tion/management, that is, not from afforestation and reforestation);
(2) climate activities to be carried out in a quantifiable manner;5 (3)
site boundaries and intervention villages determined before the
beginning of the research; (4) conditional incentives would not
begin prior to May 2010;6 (5) conditional incentives having a reason-
able chance of being implemented in subsequent years; and (6) pro-
ponent willingness to cooperate with external, independent research
(Sunderlin et al., 2016: 19). Our sample consists of all initiatives that
we could confirm met the inclusion criteria in the five study coun-
tries and thus was not subject to selection bias due to researcher
or institutional preferences. Based on a comparison of this sample
of initiatives with an independent effort to catalog all subnational
REDD+ initiatives worldwide (called ID-RECCO, Simonet et al.,
2015), we conclude that the GCS sample of sites is a ‘‘reasonable if4 The total sample is 23 initiatives. Two initiatives are completely omitted. Bolsa
oresta (Brazil) is omitted because of its unique character. It was well underway at
e time the field research began, and could not therefore be part of a ‘‘before-after”
vestigation. Cat Tien (Vietnam) had no tenure-related interventions and it was
rminated early, so it stands alone as a unique case. Jari/Amapá(Brazil) is partly
mitted. It has four intervention villages and associated sample households, but no
ntrol villages. It is excluded from the difference-in-difference analysis, but included
other forms of analysis.
5 We selected sites where greenhouse gas reduction activities are to be carried out
a quantified way, that is, with the intention to monitor, report and/or transact
ductions in carbon emissions or increases in carbon stock.
6 By ‘‘conditional incentive” we mean a quid pro quo arrangement whereby REDD+
articipants could get livelihood support (whether monetary or in-kind) in exchange
r satisfactory performance in protecting and/or enhancing forests, either on a
ousehold or village basis.Fl
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Fig. 1. Location of 21 REDD+ subnational initiatives in the sample.
9 There are only 15 sites included in the difference-in-difference analysis because
of the exclusion of the Jari/Amapá site.
10 Village land areas were classified into ‘‘state,” ‘‘community,” and ‘‘individual”
tenure categories, and eight sub-categories that specify if the land area is unclaimed,
assigned, recognized, or titled.
11 Tenure security was defined as the ability to use land over a forward-looking 25-
year period to elicit an expansive answer from respondents that included the totality
of their hopes, worries, and expectations in the long-term. This contrasts with a two-
year retrospective time horizon for questions 1 and 2. (How has tenure security
changed in the prior two years, if at all, and what are the reasons?) Though these time
frames are different, they are compatible.
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+” (Sunderlin et al., 2016: 154). There is strong alignment with the
ID-RECCO proportions on some variables (e.g. proportion of private
initiatives, those that have sold credits, those that have made pay-
ments to the local population, those that are certified, those that
have provided environmental education), and there is rough align-
ment with ID-RECCO on the main drivers of deforestation and degra-
dation. Further, some of the divergences between the average
characteristics of the subnational initiatives in ID-RECCO and the
GCS sample are due to the fact that our sample includes two large
jurisdictions in Brazil (state of Acre and municipality of São Felix
do Xingu), with the result that it contains almost half of the total
area in subnational REDD+ worldwide.
At 16 of the sites (known as ‘‘household survey” sites), our sam-
ple included four villages in the intervention areas and four similar
villages outside the intervention areas, called control villages.7 In
each of these villages, we interviewed approximately 30 households,
for a total of 240 households related to each site. To select villages at
household survey sites, field teams conducted rapid rural appraisal
on 15 candidate intervention and 15 candidate control villages with
average or above average deforestation. In each country, we selected
matched samples of four intervention and four control villages per
site that had similar distributions of population size, forest extent,
market access, and deforestation pressures, among other potentially
confounding characteristics. One intervention village at each site
was selected on the basis of being identified by the proponent as
the village most likely to succeed in reducing deforestation. At five
of 21 sites (known as ‘‘village survey” sites), we selected four inter-
vention villages, no control villages, and we did not conduct a house-
hold survey. Villages at village survey sites were selected from a pool
of 15 candidate villages per site, with one village chosen on the basis
of being judged by the proponent as most likely to succeed in reduc-
ing deforestation, and the rest were chosen randomly (Sunderlin
et al., 2016: 21-28).
Combining information on both household and village survey
sites, in Phase 1 (2010–2012) we sampled 142 villages (83 inter-
vention, 59 control) and 3944 households (2062 intervention,
1882 control). In Phase 2 (2013–2014) we sampled 141 villages8
(83 intervention, 58 control) and 3754 households (1996 interven-
tion, 1758 control). Households were selected by simple random
sample, with some instances of stratification (Sunderlin et al.,
2016: 27-28).
The data reported in this article are drawn mainly from a group
survey implemented in formal village focus groups in all study vil-
lages at two points in time (Phases 1 and 2). The respondents were
typically 10–15 adults (all at least 16 years old) selected in collab-7 The Jari/Amapá site in Brazil is an exception. It has five intervention villages but
no controls. For this reason Jari/Amapá is excluded from the difference-in-difference
analysis. It is, however, included in the other forms of analysis.
8 One village in Kilosa, Tanzania, declined participation in Phase 2.oration with the village leadership and with a diverse composition
that included men and women, young and old, rich and poor, and
long-time residents and immigrants. In soliciting answers we
sought to avoid having just a few voices dominate, and we sought
consensus answers. In cases of disagreement, there was an attempt
to obtain a consensus answer through further discussion, and if
this was not possible, a vote was taken (Sunderlin et al., 2016:
62-63, 86–87). Data from a household survey administered also
at two points in time are used to drill down into, corroborate, or
complement some of the village-level findings. The reason for pri-
mary reliance on the village-level (focus group) data is because
they capture dynamics that affect all village lands, and because
they are available at all 21 sites reported on in this article, whereas
the household-level data are available at 16 sites.9
The three research questions are answered on the basis of data
obtained from village and household interviews. Here we specify
the kinds of data obtained in relation to each research question.
1. What was the effect of REDD+ on perceived tenure insecurity of
village residents?
In one of the first sections of the village interview, we asked
respondents to identify specific land areas within the village
boundaries that are distinct by tenure type,10 and that in the
aggregate cover the whole area of the village. We then had a dis-
cussion about tenure security over those land types. We asked
the respondents to specify whether they believed the tenure of
each land area was secure or insecure at the time of the inter-
view. We specified our definition of ‘‘tenure security” as ‘‘your
confidence that the households in this village will continue to
be able to use, at least for the next 25 years11, the land and forests
you now use and benefit from in that particular tenure area.”12
We emphasize that we measured respondent perception of
tenure security, with subjective factors perhaps influencing that
perception. Furthermore, we note that these questions were
posed before we asked any questions about the local REDD+To assess whether focus group participants could have misinterpreted the
question as asking whether they would be able to use the land in the same way for
the next 25 years (two reviewers were concerned this might have happened), we
canvassed all field staff supervisors and reviewed the reasons provided for changes in
security and insecurity (see question 2). This confirmed that respondents in all
countries and all languages understood that the question was about tenure security
rather than about changes or restrictions in use.
380 W.D. Sunderlin et al. /World Development 106 (2018) 376–392initiative. The total number of village land areas was 425 in Phase
1 and 388 in Phase 2.
In the household interview, we asked the respondent to differen-
tiate household lands by tenure category (controlled and in use
by household, controlled by household but in use by other house-
hold, rented or borrowed, communal) and land cover type (agri-
culture, forest). We asked the respondents to specify whether the
tenure of each land area was secure or insecure at the time of the
interview.
2. What are the main reasons for change in the level of tenure
insecurity and security from Phase 1 to Phase 2 perceived by
village residents in control and intervention villages?
For each of the land areas identified in Phase 2, we asked
whether the tenure security of the land area had increased,
stayed the same, or decreased in the two-year period prior to
the interview.13 If the tenure security of the land area was either
lower or higher, we asked for the main reasons, and allowed up to
four answers.14
3. How do intervention village residents evaluate the impact of
tenure-related interventions on community well-being?
In the village focus groups, we asked about each tenure-related
intervention, specifying: ‘‘Which of the following choices
best describes the overall effect of the intervention on the
well-being of the community?” The closed-option responses
were: very negative; negative; no effect; positive; or very
positive. We also permitted the response ‘‘both positive and
negative”. In the analysis ‘‘very negative” and ‘‘negative” are
clustered as ‘‘negative,” ‘‘no effect” and ‘‘both negative and
positive” are clustered as ‘‘neutral,” and ‘‘positive” and ‘‘very
positive” are clustered as ‘‘positive.” In a parallel way in the
household questionnaire interview, we asked respondents:
‘‘What is your evaluation of the effect of [name of intervention]
on the well-being of your household?” The response options
were the same as those for the village questionnaire respon-
dents.15 Different from questions 1 and 2, in question 3 we limit
our attention to the data from intervention villages.
A survey of village interventions was conducted in 2012–2013 to
catalogue all interventions aimed intentionally at forest conserva-
tion, both in control and intervention villages and households
(Sunderlin et al., 2016: 94–95). Among the seven types of inter-
ventions catalogued, two tenure-related interventions are spot-
lighted in this article: (1) tenure clarifications (TC), which we
define as activities aimed at resolving unclear or contested own-
ership and access rights over local forestlands, trees, and carbon;
and (2) restrictions on forest access and conversion (RFAC), which
we define as activities such as determining the boundaries of set-
aside forests, reaching agreement with local stakeholders on
restricted forest use, community monitoring, enhanced policing
of forest access and use, imposition of fines, enforcement of forest13 Note that in relation to Question 1 we ask about perceived tenure security at the
time of the interview, and in relation to Question 2 we ask about the change in
perceived tenure security in the course of the two years prior to the interview. It may
seem redundant to ask respondents the current status of tenure security at the time of
the interview, and change in tenure security in the recent past. Logically, there can be
a relationship between the two answers, but they describe different realities. One is a
static measure and the other dynamic.
14 The reasons were pre-coded and there was no prompting when posing the
question to respondents. Post-coding adjustments were made as reasons surfaced
that were not anticipated prior to the field work.
15 In the last section of both the village and household surveys, we asked questions
that evaluate the impacts of each forest protection/REDD+ intervention at the site. We
are confident that the respondents clearly understood exactly which interventions we
were discussing, because we conducted a prior survey (‘‘Survey of Village Interven-
tions”) in which we carefully segregated all interventions into specific categories, and
identified the exact local name of each specific intervention. This ensured that there
was no confusion about which interventions we meant, and what the interventions
intended.protection laws and regulations, land use planning (if aimed at
forest protection); and challenging claims made by internal or
external agents to convert local forests to non-forest use. We call
RFAC tenure-related because these interventions tend to con-
strain historic customary rights of local stakeholders to local for-
ests, or land claims made on forest lands and resources by
outsiders. At many sites, these types of interventions were imple-
mented primarily by the government, sometimes – but not always
– in coordination with the REDD+ proponent organization.
Table 1 shows the distribution of RFAC and TC interventions as
documented across the sample of villages and households. High
variation of intensity of deployment is evident, defined as the per-
centage of villages where an intervention is implemented, and/or
the percentage of households involved in the intervention.16 The
table shows that although the interventions may have nominally
reached many villages (see ‘‘village survey” column), the imple-
mentation of the interventions tends to reach only a portion of vil-
lage households (see ‘‘household survey” column). The table also
shows that while either RFAC or TC interventions are imple-
mented universally and equally across control and intervention
villages in Brazil and Peru, implementation is disproportionately
focused on intervention villages and households in Cameroon,
Tanzania, and Indonesia.17 In Brazil and Peru, the reason for
implementation of RFAC interventions across control and inter-
vention villages is that most consisted of either environmental
patrols and fines by government actors (across Brazilian sites)
or land use restrictions in Brazil nut concessions (one site in Peru).
Although these interventions were not implemented by REDD+
proponents, they were key strategies to reduce deforestation
and forest degradation in these areas (Duchelle et al., 2017).
2.1. Data analysis
To address research question 1 (Table 2, Table 3, Fig. 2), we first
present summary statistics on the distribution of tenure-related
interventions (Table 1). Then we disaggregate the data on village
land areas to describe the incidence of insecure tenure by phase
and by intervention versus control villages, and estimate the effect
of REDD+ by modeling the count of land areas with insecure tenure
in a difference-in-difference framework. At the village level, we use
the full sample of villages, both because of the small sample size
and because the villages were ‘‘pre-matched.” Specifically, we
selected our sample of villages to balance baseline characteristics
by pre-matching with rapid rural appraisal data (Sills et al.,
2017). We estimate a multi-level model of the count of village land
areas perceived to have insecure tenure as a function of treatment
(control/intervention), time (before-after) and their interaction,
with site as a random effect, using the ‘‘glmer” function in the
glmer package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). We
assess statistical significance of the coefficients at the 1% (⁄⁄⁄), 5%
(⁄⁄), and 10% (⁄) levels.
At the household level, we also estimate multilevel regressions
using matched data in a ‘‘difference-in-difference” framework to
assess changes in the insecurity of agricultural and forest land used
and controlled by the household. We first assessed whether attri-
tion bias is likely to be a significant concern, considering that in
phase 2, we were able to locate and interview only 3299 house-
holds out of the 3944 interviewed in phase 1 (16% attrition). Using16 We define a household as being involved if it is an intended target or beneficiary
in the implementation of the intervention (e.g. household’s forest access has been or
will be reduced, or has or will receive livelihood benefits). We do not consider the
household involved if it is indirectly affected by another household’s involvement
(e.g. household is in resource competition with an involved household whose access
to forest has been decreased) or if it is merely aware of the intervention.
17 In Brazil and Peru there are government-level tenure-related interventions
applied on a wide scale, that is, both in control and intervention villages.
Table 1
Distribution of tenure-related interventions across countries and villages, and degree of involvement by study households, Phase 2.
Country Category Village survey Household survey
N Percent of
villages with
RFAC
Percent of
villages with TC
Percent of villages
with RFAC or TC
N Percent of households
engaged in RFAC
Percent of
households engaged
in TC
Percent of households
engaged in RFAC or TC
Brazil Total 37 100.0% 75.7% 100.0% 1048 63.3% 15.0% 74.3%
Intervention 21 100.0% 76.2% 100.0% 605 66.3% 49.4% 79.8%
Control 16 100.0% 75.0% 100.0% 443 59.1% 48.8% 66.8%
Peru Total 16 100.0% 50.0% 100.0% 495 60.8% 14.1% 60.8%
Intervention 8 100.0% 50.0% 100.0% 249 57.8% 27.7% 57.8%
Control 8 100.0% 50.0% 100.0% 246 63.8% 0.4% 63.8%
Cameroon Total 13 84.6% 38.5% 84.6% 474 37.6% 18.6% 41.1%
Intervention 6 100.0% 83.3% 100.0% 254 47.2% 34.6% 53.9%
Control 7 71.4% 0.0% 71.4% 220 26.4% 0.0% 26.4%
Tanzania Total 30 76.7% 26.7% 90.0% 396 18.9% 2.3% 19.2%
Intervention 23 78.3% 34.8% 95.7% 206 26.2% 4.4% 26.7%
Control 7 71.4% 0.0% 71.4% 190 11.1% 0.0% 11.1%
Indonesia Total 45 33.3% 17.8% 40.0% 1340 5.0% 2.5% 6.7%
Intervention 25 60.0% 32.0% 72.0% 681 9.8% 4.8% 13.2%
Control 20 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 659 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Note: ‘‘RFAC” is ‘‘restrictions on forest access and conversion” and ‘‘TC” is ‘‘tenure clarification.
Fig. 2. Change in tenure insecurity at the household level, comparison of agricultural and forest lands.
W.D. Sunderlin et al. /World Development 106 (2018) 376–392 381the phase 1 data, we found that tenure insecurity is not signifi-
cantly related to either attrition status or the interaction of attri-
tion status and village type (intervention vs. control), suggesting
that attrition bias is not likely to affect our particular model
(Becketti, Gould, Lillard, & Welch, 1988). We therefore proceeded
to perform genetic matching with the sample of households inter-
viewed in both phase 1 and phase 2, using the package Matching
(Sekhon, 2011) and MatchIt (Ho, Imai, King, & Stuart, 2011) in R(R Core Team, 2015) to identify a well-balanced sub-sample of
households for further analysis.
The matching process was designed to obtain balance on five
broad categories of covariates: (1) household socioeconomic indi-
cators (total value of physical assets, total income, indices of house
quality and condition, access to utilities); (2) household demo-
graphics (age and gender and years of education of household head;
household size; dependency ratio); (3) household use of the forest
Table 2
Difference-in-difference results on change in tenure insecurity at the village level.
N Difference Village lands insecurity
Estimate Std. Error Z-value Pr (>|z|)
POOLED Intercept N = 283 0.51 0.52 0.98 0.327
BA 2.04% 0.38 0.27 1.40 0.161
CI 11.96% 0.34 0.25 1.36 0.173
BACI (DiD) 3.25% 0.02 0.35 0.05 0.962
BRAZIL Intercept N = 74 0.84 0.68 1.25 0.212
BA 23.84% 0.80 0.63 1.28 0.201
CI 34.52% 1.22 0.63 1.96 0.050*
BACI (DiD) 16.37% 0.96 0.96 1.01 0.314
PERU Intercept N = 32 0.24 0.40 0.60 0.549
BA 8.85% 0.02 0.62 0.03 0.977
CI 21.88% 0.93 0.59 1.58 0.114
BACI (DiD) 21.89% 1.03 0.89 1.16 0.247
CAMEROON Intercept N = 26 0.00 0.53 0.00 1.000
BA 17.69% 0.08 0.67 0.12 0.905
CI 51.59% 2.48 1.17 2.12 0.034**
BACI (DiD) 54.84% 2.68 1.33 2.02 0.043**
TANZANIA Intercept N = 61 0.87 0.80 1.09 0.277
BA 14.73% 1.78 1.16 1.54 0.124
CI 18.33% 1.14 0.84 1.36 0.174
BACI (DiD) 6.22% 0.00 1.59 0.00 1.000
INDONESIA Intercept N = 90 0.38 0.32 1.18 0.238
BA 10.49% 0.82 0.36 2.29 0.022**
CI 13.90% 0.32 0.30 1.06 0.288
BACI (DiD) 5.88% 0.07 0.46 0.16 0.872
Note: For the pooled sample and each country, the columns report the total number of villages and the difference in the percent of land areas that are insecure, comparing
before and after (BA), control and intervention (CI), and the difference in difference, or the change in intervention villages relative to change in control villages (BACI).
Differences are calculated as a double average, i.e., first averaging the percentage insecurity for each village to account for variable number of land parcels among villages, and
then averaging at the country level. The next set of columns reports estimation results for multilevel regressions, including the coefficient, standard error, z-value, p-value and
statistical significance at p < 0.10 (*), p < 0.05 (**), and p < 0.01 (***) for the intercept, an indicator for phase 2 (after), an indicator for intervention, and the interaction of those
two indicators.
Table 3
Difference-in-difference results on change in tenure insecurity at the household level.
Household agricultural land tenure insecurity Household forestland tenure insecurity
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
POOLED Intercept N = 5781 8.16 0.35 –23.59 <0.0001 N = 4194 10.28 0.47 21.76 <0.0001
BA 0.66 0.44 1.47 0.141 0.09 0.59 0.15 0.883
CI 0.44 0.35 1.25 0.212 0.19 0.49 0.37 0.708
BACI (DiD) 0.89 0.52 1.69 0.091* 0.30 0.70 0.43 0.666
BRAZIL Intercept N = 1602 9.68 0.61 15.80 <0.0001 N = 1578 10.77 0.61 17.61 <0.0001
BA 1.03 0.86 1.19 0.235 0.52 0.84 0.62 0.538
CI 0.52 0.65 0.80 0.422 0.04 0.66 0.06 0.950
BACI (DiD) 1.79 0.99 1.82 0.069* 0.87 0.97 0.90 0.369
PERU Intercept N = 804 11.64 1.35 8.65 <0.0001 N = 753 11.76 1.56 7.53 0.000
BA 0.36 1.76 0.20 0.839 4.25 1.16 3.67 <0.001***
CI 0.30 1.55 0.19 0.848 2.10 1.37 1.53 0.125
BACI (DiD) 0.27 2.13 0.13 0.899 2.18 1.31 1.65 0.098*
CAMEROON Intercept N = 821 3.41 0.55 6.25 <0.0001 N = 638 10.45 1.40 7.45 <0.0001
BA 0.70 0.31 2.23 0.026** 0.12 1.73 0.07 0.945
CI 0.72 0.73 0.99 0.323 0.48 1.60 0.30 0.763
BACI (DiD) 1.62 0.37 4.40 <0.001*** 0.39 2.46 0.16 0.873
TANZANIA Intercept N = 681 5.93 2.42 2.45 0.014
BA 52.03 460.84 0.11 0.910
CI 0.86 2.18 0.39 0.694
BACI (DiD) 23.90 515.23 0.05 0.963
INDONESIA Intercept N = 1873 2.79 0.43 6.46 <0.001 N = 753 2.25 0.56 4.00 <0.0001
BA 0.43 0.17 2.61 0.009*** 1.21 0.54 2.26 0.024**
CI 0.43 0.45 0.97 0.334 0.15 0.48 0.31 0.754
BACI (DiD) 0.13 0.20 0.65 0.514 0.19 0.63 0.30 0.767
Note: The multilevel regression levels of significance are indicated as ‘‘*” at p < 0.10, ‘‘**” at p < 0.05 and ‘‘***” at p < 0.01. The estimates in the ‘‘BA” line are the effects of after
(vs. before) on tenure insecurity. The estimates in the ‘‘CI” line are the effects of intervention (vs. control) villages. ‘‘BACI” is the interaction term and thus the coefficient is the
change through time in intervention villages relative to their control, i.e. the effect that is attributable to REDD+. Reported N are the sample sizes used for estimation of each
model: matched samples of households controlling agricultural or forest land.
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income from forest); (4) household involvement in existing/previ-
ous forest conservation activities (government and/or NGO sup-
port, PES payments); and (5) village characteristics (distance to
road and/or river with year-round access, distance to market).For each of these five categories, we first performed a principal
component analysis (PCA) using the PCAmixdata package for R
(Chavent, Kuentz, Labenne, Liquet, & Saracco, 2014), which allows
integration of quantitative and qualitative data, in order to (a)
reduce the number of individual covariates to match on, while
Table 4
Top ten reasons at the village level why tenure has become more insecure in the two years prior to the interview, in descending order from most frequent reason.
Reasons Village Type Brazil Cameroon Indonesia Peru Tanzania Total Percent of all reasons
Problems with outside company Total 3 5 25 0 1 34 16.9%
Intervention 3 1 5 0 1 10
Control 0 4 20 0 0 24
Have no title, no or weak document, or weak claim Total 5 0 20 1 2 28 13.9%
Intervention 4 0 3 0 2 9
Control 1 0 17 1 0 19
Problems with or fear/distrust of government Total 5 5 1 12 0 23 11.4%
Intervention 3 3 1 7 0 14
Control 2 2 0 5 0 9
Rights can be easily revoked Total 1 3 12 0 0 16 8.0%
Intervention 1 2 3 0 0 6
Control 0 1 9 0 0 10
Competition for land with people from other village Total 0 0 13 1 1 15 7.5%
Intervention 0 0 8 0 1 9
Control 0 0 5 1 0 6
Conflicts over land Total 2 0 7 0 1 10 5.0%
Intervention 2 0 4 0 1 7
Control 0 0 3 0 0 3
Unclear border, boundaries Total 0 0 7 1 1 9 4.8%
Intervention 0 0 4 0 1 5
Control 0 0 3 1 0 4
Invasions/fear of invasions (outsiders, indigenous, etc.) Total 0 1 5 2 0 8 4.0%
Intervention 0 0 3 1 0 4
Control 0 1 2 1 0 4
Natural conditions are poor or pose risk Total 0 0 0 6 0 6 3.0%
Intervention 0 0 0 3 0 3
Control 0 0 0 3 0 3
Ambiguity of rights with de facto open access Total 1 3 1 0 0 5 2.5%
Intervention 1 2 0 0 0 3
Control 0 1 1 0 0 2
Table 5
Top ten reasons at the village level why tenure has become more secure in the two years prior to the interview, in descending order from most frequent reason.
Reasons Village Type Brazil Came-roon Indo-nesia Peru Tanzania Total Percent of all reasons
REDD+ initiative has strengthened our rights claims on land Total 0 2 3 0 4 9 9.9%
Intervention 0 2 3 0 4 9
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0
Clear boundaries or borders Total 0 1 3 1 2 7 7.7%
Intervention 0 1 3 1 2 7
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rights are now enforced Total 0 3 1 0 1 5 5.5%
Intervention 0 2 1 0 1 4
Control 0 1 0 0 0 1
Rights can no longer be revoked Total 0 1 4 0 0 5 5.5%
Intervention 0 0 4 0 0 4
Control 0 1 0 0 0 1
Villagers recognize rights within community Total 0 0 5 0 0 5 5.5%
Intervention 0 0 5 0 0 5
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0
Land is owned Total 2 1 1 0 0 4 4.4%
Intervention 0 0 1 0 0 1
Control 2 1 0 0 0 3
Ownership recognized by active land management Total 0 1 2 1 0 4 4.4%
Intervention 0 1 2 1 0 4
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rights recognized or governed customary law Total 0 0 2 0 2 4 4.4%
Intervention 0 0 2 0 0 2
Control 0 0 0 0 2 2
Rights recognized/governed by village authorities Total 0 0 3 0 1 4 4.4%
Intervention 0 0 3 0 1 4
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0
Government project connected to REDD+ initiative Total 2 0 1 0 0 3 3.3%
Intervention 0 0 1 0 0 2
Control 2 0 0 0 0 1
W.D. Sunderlin et al. /World Development 106 (2018) 376–392 383(b) maintaining the likelihood that the sample will also be matched
on unobserved variation correlated with any of the variables used
in the PCA. We matched on the first three PCA dimensions of each
of the five groups of covariates, which ensured a cumulative
explained variation of over 40% of all categories, in addition to
the propensity score based on these principal components.Subsequently, for each country we estimated multilevel regres-
sions of the proportion of household (agricultural or forest) land
holding (in ha) perceived to have insecure tenure, using the same
modeling approach as for village-level data. All regressions were
tested for overdispersion and fitted with an individual-level
crossed random effect as needed (Harrison, 2014). The model of
Table 6
Perceived effect of tenure-related interventions (RFAC, TC, and both RFAC and TC) on community well-being in intervention villages, Phase 2. Number and percent of evaluations
of tenure interventions at village level.
Country Effect of tenure intervention on community well-being RFAC TC Total
N Percent N Percent N Percent
Brazil Total 31 100.0% 16 100.0% 47 100.0%
Negative 12 38.7% 4 25.0% 16 34.0%
Neutral 17 54.8% 8 50.0% 25 53.2%
Positive 2 6.5% 4 25.0% 6 12.8%
Peru Total 11 100.0% 4 100.0% 15 100.0%
Negative 2 18.2% 1 25.0% 3 20.0%
Neutral 8 72.7% 3 75.0% 11 73.3%
Positive 1 9.1% 0 0.0% 1 6.7%
Cameroon Total 6 100.0% 4 100.0% 10 100.0%
Negative 1 16.7% 0 0.0% 1 10.0%
Neutral 2 33.3% 2 50.0% 4 40.0%
Positive 3 50.0% 2 50.0% 5 50.0%
Tanzania Total 21 100.0% 12 100.0% 33 100.0%
Negative 3 14.3% 0 0.0% 3 9.1%
Neutral 10 47.6% 9 75.0% 19 57.6%
Positive 8 38.1% 3 25.0% 11 33.3%
Indonesia Total 22 100.0% 11 100.0% 33 100.0%
Negative 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Neutral 11 50.0% 6 54.5% 17 51.5%
Positive 11 50.0% 5 45.5% 16 48.5%
All Total 91 100.0% 47 100.0% 138 100.0%
Negative 18 19.8% 5 10.6% 23 16.7%
Neutral 48 52.7% 28 59.6% 76 55.1%
Positive 25 27.5% 14 29.8% 39 28.3%
Note: ‘‘RFAC” is restrictions on forest access and conversion” and ‘‘TC” is tenure clarification.
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addition of ‘‘country” as a nested random effect.
To address questions 2 and 3, we rely on descriptive statistics of
responses in the village focus groups (see Tables 4, 5, and 6 and
Annex 2) and household interviews (Annex 3). To summarize per-
ceived reasons for increased tenure insecurity and security, we
spotlight the top ten reasons reported in the focus groups (Tables
4 and 5 respectively). With respect to tenure insecurity (Table 4),
this includes 154 (77%) of the total 201 reasons offered for
decreased security in the 82 of 388 Phase 2 land areas where
tenure security is perceived to have decreased. With respect to
tenure security (Table 5), the top ten reasons include 50 (55%) of
the total 91 reasons offered and are drawn from 48 of 388 Phase
2 land areas where tenure security is perceived to have increased.
For both Tables 4 and 5, the cells report the number of villages
where a particular reason for increased tenure insecurity or secu-
rity was mentioned in the group interviews. In analyzing the
well-being effect of tenure-related interventions (Table 6), we clas-
sify the perceived effects at the village level (negative, neutral, pos-
itive) by country, and by type of intervention (RFAC alone, TC
alone, both RFAC and TC).3. Results
1. What was the effect of REDD+ on perceived tenure insecurity
of village residents?
Table 2 displays the village-level difference-in-difference
results. It shows that tenure insecurity has increased over time
in Brazil and Peru (irrespective of control and intervention, i.e.
positive percent in the column ‘‘Difference” and the row ‘‘BA”),
while decreasing in the other countries. The change over time is
statistically significant only in Indonesia (statistically significant
negative coefficient estimate in the BA row). In Brazil and Camer-
oon, we note a significant difference in the level of insecurity at
baseline, with both countries showing higher insecurity in the vil-
lages selected for intervention (statistically significant coefficient
estimates in the CI row). While in Brazil, tenure insecurity thenfollowed similar trends in intervention and control villages over
time, the trends diverged in Cameroon with a stronger decrease
in tenure insecurity in the intervention villages, resulting in the
only statistically significant effect of REDD+ on tenure insecurity
at the village level. The limited statistical significance of the
results in this table may partly reflect the small sample size of
villages (by country) and the variation in trends across country
(in the pooled results). Thus, the patterns in the difference col-
umn are also worth considering. In some countries, the change
in the level of tenure insecurity is more favorable (in the sense
of a more pronounced move toward security) in intervention than
control villages (e.g. Cameroon, Indonesia), while in others, it is
less favorable in intervention than control villages (e.g. Brazil,
Peru, Tanzania). In our pooled results across all sites and countries
at the village level, the difference suggests that REDD+ reduces
tenure insecurity, but the effect is not statistically significant.
Table 3 displays household-level difference-in-difference
results, disaggregated between agricultural and forest household
lands, and Fig. 2 shows these results in graphical form.
The difference-in-difference results at the household level
(Table 3) show that in REDD+ intervention villages in Brazil, tenure
insecurity for agricultural lands increased relative to control sites,
while there was no difference in the trends for forest lands. In Peru,
tenure insecurity of forest land increased over time, but this
increase was smaller in intervention villages. In Cameroon,
household agricultural land insecurity increases over time in con-
trol villages, but decreases in intervention villages. In Indonesia,
household tenure insecurity decreased on both agricultural and
forest lands, in both control and intervention villages. In Tanzania,
we detect no significant change in agricultural land tenure. We do
not report estimation results for forest lands in Tanzania, because
only a few households control forest land and they consistently
reported a low level of tenure insecurity.
The pooled results at the household level show that REDD+ has
increased tenure insecurity on agricultural lands and did not affect
forest land tenure insecurity. On the basis of this result, we reject
the hypothesis that REDD+ decreases smallholder tenure insecu-
rity. This is further supported by the country level results: in three
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curity of agricultural lands, significantly in only one country, and
in two countries, the point estimates suggest that REDD+
decreased tenure insecurity of agricultural lands, significantly in
only one country. Thus, there is clearly no general pattern of
improvements in smallholder perceptions of agricultural tenure
security due to REDD+ .
2. What are the main reasons for change in the level of tenure
insecurity and security from Phase 1 to Phase 2 perceived by vil-
lage residents in control and intervention villages?
In answer to the question about the direction of tenure security
change in the two years prior to the Phase 2 interview (see Ques-
tion 1), the results show that there was ‘‘no change” at an average
of two-thirds of the land areas across the sample countries. In Bra-
zil, Peru, Cameroon, and Indonesia the number of land areas with
lower tenure security exceeded those with higher tenure security,
whereas the number of land areas with higher security exceeded
those with lower security only in Tanzania (Annex 2).
Across the sample there were 82 of 388 Phase 2 land areas
(21.1%) where tenure insecurity is perceived to have increased,
and 201 reasons for the increase. The top ten reasons, accounting
for 77% of all reasons stated in the village-level interviews, are
reported in Table 4.18 There are at least19 three reasons related to
external claims on local forests: ‘‘problems with outside company,”
ranked no. 1 at 16.9%; ‘‘competition for land with people from other
village,” ranked no. 5 at 7.5%; and ‘‘invasions or fear of invasions”
ranked no. 8 at 4.0%. Jointly, these three reasons (28.4%) make it clear
that outside claims on local forests are the most important single
explanation for increasing tenure insecurity. The hypothesis that
external claims on local forests are the main reason for tenure inse-
curity is upheld.
It is noteworthy that most of the reasons for increased tenure
insecurity given are concentrated in Indonesia. This is a reflection
of the fact that 37 of the 82 land areas (45%) with increased tenure
insecurity are in that country, and this in turn is a reflection of the
fact that 199 of the 388 land areas (51.3%) are in Indonesia. The
high concentration of land areas in Indonesia was a methods
choice: the Indonesia team decided to investigate tenure issues
at a higher level of detail than the other country teams. The high
rate of the response ‘‘problems with outside company” in Indone-
sia is because of the large number of study villages where oil palm
and other companies have made claims.
The second most prevalent answer, ‘‘have no title, no or weak
document, or weak claim,” also has a high profile in Indonesia. In
Indonesia, people understand that their land tenure would be
stronger (and/or recognized by government) if they had a land cer-
tificate or title. However, the process is costly and difficult so very
few villagers go through it. The strong showing of this reason in
Brazil makes sense given the lack of formal land titles at our study
sites. Many properties at our study sites have been georeferenced
through the Rural Environmental Registry (CAR) program, but
there is no guarantee that this will lead to land titles
(Damasceno, Chiavari, & Lopes, 2017).
In Peru, the reasons for higher tenure insecurity have largely to
do with ‘‘problems with or fear/distrust of government authorities”
and ‘‘natural conditions are poor/pose risk.” At the Madre de Dios
site, there are overlapping claims to Brazil nut and timber conces-
sions, and Brazil nut producers are highly distrustful of govern-18 Although the coding labels in Tables 4 and 5 may suggest a degree of overlap, we
carefully defined the codes to avoid this problem and assure that the responses are
orthogonal. In the process of assigning codes, we were careful to specify middle-leve
categories (avoiding too much generality or detail), thus avoiding the typical coding
problem of gaps or overlaps among categories.
19 Other reasons (e.g. ‘‘conflicts over land,” ‘‘unclear borders and boundaries”) may
disguise instances of external claims on local forests.lment authorities (Garrish, Perales, Duchelle, & Cronkleton, 2014).
At the Ucayali site, the dynamics of flooded forests – including
more flooding than normal in recent years – alter local people’s
access to landholdings (Rodriguez-Ward & Paredes del Aguila,
2014).
Responses at the household level on reasons for tenure insecu-
rity at the time of the interview (and not reasons for increasing
tenure insecurity at the village level as above) partly corroborate
these findings. Six of the top ten reasons are the same as those in
Table 4, though with different rankings. The rankings are: ‘‘Have
no title, no or weak document, or weak claim” (33.2%); ‘‘Land is
borrowed or rented” (11.5%); ‘‘Problems with or fear/ distrust of
government authorities” (9.5%); ‘‘Rights can be easily revoked”
(7.9%); ‘‘Problems with outside company” (5.6%); ‘‘Changes in
law or policy” (4.2%); ‘‘Rights are only temporary” (4.2%); ‘‘Inva-
sions or fear of invasions” (3.2%); ‘‘Existential fear” (3.0%); and
‘‘Conflicts over land” (2.2%). Recall, however, (from the methods
section), that these are different questions at different scales, so
it is expected that the answers would be different.
Across the sample there were 48 of 388 land areas (12.4%)
where tenure security is perceived to have increased, and 91 rea-
sons for the increase. The top ten results, accounting for 55% of
all reasons stated in the village-level interviews, are reported in
Table 5. The most prevalent reason is ‘‘REDD+ initiative has
strengthened our rights claims” (9.9%). Some other reasons are
likely REDD+-related, inasmuch as the majority (42 of 50) are
reported in intervention villages and the stated reasons correspond
to the aims of proponents e.g., boundary clarification and enforce-
ment of rights. This finding supports the hypothesis that REDD+ is
the main (single) reason for improved tenure security, however it
falls short of demonstrating that REDD+ explains most tenure secu-
rity improvements where they are reported. As in Table 4, the
results have a disproportionately high count for Indonesia, with
20 of the 48 land areas (41.6%) with improved tenure security
located in that country.
3. How do intervention village residents evaluate the impact of
tenure-related interventions on community well-being?
Table 6 shows the results on the perceived effect of tenure-
related interventions on community well-being at the village level.
The units in the table are evaluations of specific tenure-related
interventions by respondents in the village-level interviews. The
table specifies the results in terms of the two types of intervention
(restriction on forest access and conversion, tenure clarification),
and the aggregate of the two (all tenure-related interventions).
The results for all countries (see bottom of table) show a net
positive view, with 16.7% of villages having a negative view,
55.1% a neutral view, and 28.3% a positive view. The results are cor-
roborated at the household level (see Annex 3) with 18.6% holding
a negative view, 35.5% a neutral view, and 46.0% a positive view.
Why is the positive outlook stronger at the household than the vil-
lage level? We do not know, but it is clear there is a different logic
at work in evaluating the security of village lands (encompassing
dominant tenure types in land areas) as compared to household
lands (i.e. lands largely under the control of the household itself).
Looking at the results for specific countries at the village level,
we see that Cameroon, Tanzania, and Indonesia have a net positive
evaluation of the well-being impact of tenure-related interventions
with a tendency toward a higher share of non-negative responses,
whereas Brazil and Peru have a net negative evaluation, with fewer
villages reporting positive responses (Table 6). At the household
level, there is a net positive view of tenure-related interventions
in all countries (Annex 3).
The results suggest a somewhat less positive evaluation of the
impact of restrictions on forest access and control (RFAC) than
tenure clarification (TC) interventions, both at the village and
household level (Table 6, Annex 3). Nevertheless there is a net pos-
0 Carbon cowboys are dubbed ‘‘questionable carbon project developers” by the
edia, according to Babon, McIntyre, & Sofe, 2012; see also de Jong, del Castillo
orres, & Salazar, 2012.
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tions. We can therefore reject the hypothesis that local stakehold-
ers will have a favorable view of tenure clarification interventions,
and a negative view of restrictions on forest access and conversion
interventions, at the level of all countries. It should be taken into
account, however, that this analysis does not distinguish RFAC
interventions that restrict access for village households versus for
actors external to the village. Also, the hypothesis is partly sup-
ported in Brazil and Peru, where there is a net negative evaluation
of the impact of RFAC interventions (both countries) and of the TC
interventions (Peru only) at the village level (Table 6). At the
household level, there is no net negative view of RFAC or TC inter-
ventions in any country (Annex 3). However, results in a separate
analysis of interventions at the household level highlight how
heavy-handed RFAC interventions applied on their own (i.e. with-
out incentives in the mix) negatively affected tenure security and
local perceptions of well-being (Duchelle et al., 2017) .
There appears to be a correspondence between trends in per-
ceived tenure insecurity between Phase 1 and Phase 2 and the
appraisal of tenure-related interventions. Tenure insecurity tends
to increase over time in Brazil and Peru (Table 2, BA result), and
this appears to be corroborated by the fact that Brazil and Peru
show the least positive evaluations of the impact of tenure-
related interventions on community well-being (Table 6). Con-
versely, the decrease in tenure insecurity between Phase 1 and
Phase 2 in Indonesia (Table 2, BA result) is matched by more pos-
itive evaluations of the impact of tenure-related interventions in
that country (Table 6, Annex 3). Cameroon, Tanzania also show
the same pattern, although the decrease in tenure insecurity was
not significant at the village level (Table 2, BA result).
4. Discussion
The overarching question of this article is: What impact did
REDD+ have on the security of tenure rights for local stakeholders?
The results reveal a patchwork of progress and lack of progress
across land uses and countries.
Among the areas of progress we can see the following. As
reported in village focus groups, in three out of five countries, tenure
insecurity appears to have decreased over time, significantly so in
Indonesia. In Cameroon, REDD+ villages have higher tenure insecu-
rity, but REDD+ has effectively reduced that insecurity (Table 2). At
the aggregate level, tenure insecurity at the village level decreased
more in intervention as compared to control, although thedifference
is not statistically significant with our relatively small sample of vil-
lages (Annex 2). By disaggregating land in agricultural and forest
use, we find that the bundle of interventions in REDD+ villages
increased tenure insecurity of agricultural landheldby smallholders
in Brazil but decreased the tenure insecurity of forest land held by
smallholders in Peru. In contrast to these mixed findings from the
difference-in-difference analysis, smallholders have a moderately
net positive view of tenure-related interventions at the village level
(Table 6), and a relatively strong net positive view at the household
level (Annex3).Where they report improvements in tenure security,
REDD+ interventions are a leading reason, althoughnotnecessarily a
dominant one (Table 5).
Lack of progress can be seen in the following results. For all of
the effort deployed to reduce tenure insecurity in REDD+ in the
period 2010 to 2014, it has barely changed across all countries,
and we only find evidence of a decrease in tenure insecurity attri-
butable to REDD+ in one country among the five: Cameroon
(Tables 2 and 3).
There is an inverse relationship between the intensity of
deployment of tenure-related interventions and success in reduc-
ing tenure insecurity. Brazil and Peru have high rates of tenure-
related intervention deployment (Table 1), but low success inreducing tenure insecurity (Table 2), and relatively low perceived
positive impact of tenure-related interventions (Table 6). This
may reflect the fact that organizations other than project propo-
nents – most notably the government – are carrying out tenure-
related interventions in those countries. Conversely, Cameroon,
Tanzania, and Indonesia have relatively low tenure-related inter-
vention deployment (Table 1), relatively high success in reducing
tenure insecurity (Table 2), and relatively high perceived positive
impact of tenure-related interventions (Table 6). Indonesia
achieved success in reducing tenure insecurity in both control
and intervention villages, and the success is not attributable to
REDD+ (Table 3). This is perplexing considering that all tenure-
related interventions were deployed in intervention villages and
households, and none in controls (Table 1).
What can be done to improve the slow progress in laying an
appropriate foundation for REDD+? To answer that question, we
must first address a series of questions that surface from the sum-
mary of findings above.
Why does REDD+ increase smallholder perceptions of tenure
insecurity over agricultural lands in the Brazilian sites, in spite of
institutional collaboration between proponents, government, and
civil society organizations that might be expected to benefit
smallholders?
Subnational REDD+ initiatives may be targeted at highly-
forested and highly-threatened areas where the carbon gains of
avoiding deforestation and forest degradation will be greatest.
Many of the REDD+ sites in our sample are located on such forest
frontier areas where land rights and markets are also notoriously
precarious (Holland, Coomes, & Robinson, 2016). Although Brazil
has allocated a comparatively large share of its forest estate to for-
mal control by indigenous peoples and local communities (RRI,
2014: 15), the country ranks low on secure property rights on a
world scale (Damasceno et al., 2017; Mueller, 2016). While propo-
nents took early steps to work with governmental agencies to clar-
ify land tenure at these sites and engage in the CAR process
(Duchelle et al., 2014), real progress on the ground has been slower
and more problematic than expected (Gebara, 2014). Most of the
RFAC interventions applied in the study villages were government
restrictions on smallholder clearing of forests for agriculture,
which can translate into low levels of tenure security for people
without clear land rights (i.e. title). Across the Brazilian Amazon,
these government restrictions increasingly mean that people with-
out clear land rights (i.e. title) report low levels of tenure security.
In a case study in the eastern Brazilian Amazon, Viana et al. (2016)
found that even collaborative efforts between local government,
civil society, and landowners to reduce deforestation can end up
marginalizing smallholders. Indeed across all sites in Brazil, lack
of title, fear of rights being revoked, and government restrictions
on land use were the main reasons given for land tenure insecurity
in both intervention and control villages.
In Peru, why has tenure insecurity generally worsened over
time on forest lands held by smallholders, and how has REDD+
effectively dampened that trend for households in intervention
villages?
It is not surprising that forest areas are more insecure than agri-
cultural areas in Peru, as this fits with the findings of previous
studies (e.g. Cronkleton & Larson, 2015) and is linked to the law
that declares forests public property and prohibits their titling.
What is less clear is why there is a highly significant increase in
insecurity over time in forests, and why there is significantly less
increase in intervention than in control villages, despite concern
about ‘‘carbon cowboys” operating in Peru.”202
m
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overall worsening of tenure security over forests. It is notable that
12 of 16 villages named ‘‘problems with or fear/distrust of govern-
ment” as one of the reasons for an increase in insecurity. A review
of other village data on land conflict shows that all eight villages in
Madre de Dios have problems with their Brazil nut concessions –
problems that must be resolved by government authorities. Many
concessions have overlapping borders (Garrish et al., 2014). Also,
by law, the concessionaires are responsible for outsiders’ incur-
sions; in Phase 2 interviews, villagers mention issues with corrupt
officials and needing to pay bribes to get issues resolved.
Overall tenure insecurity may have worsened due to other con-
textual factors. In 2014, for example, the indigenous activist Edwin
Chota, who fought for his community’s land title and against illegal
loggers, was murdered with three other men; the case drew
national and international attention.21 At the same time, the
regions were in the midst of gubernatorial elections, land titles were
being issued subject to multiple interpretations of regulatory proce-
dures, and regulations relating to a new forestry law were still under
negotiation (Kowler L.F. et al., 2016).
With regard to the better outcome in intervention than control
sites, the research suggests three possible reasons. First, if distrust
of government is a primary, common concern, then having an NGO
working in the village, such as in the intervention villages, can
somewhat mitigate this concern by providing the perception of
support. The same could potentially be true for natural resource
risks, which is the second most-mentioned reason by both groups.
Second, the distribution of tenure-related interventions (Table 1)
shows, at the household level, that almost 30% of households in
intervention villages were involved in tenure clarification, com-
pared to less than 1% in control villages. Finally, three explanations
for increasing insecurity in Table 4 appear only in control villages,
although only in one each: having a title or weak right, competition
for land and unclear borders.
On the national scale, REDD+ has been a strong impetus for
addressing and clarifying land and forest tenure rights, with multi-
ple titling programs currently underway with substantial interna-
tional support through REDD+-related finance. Most of these
programs were beginning to hit the ground by the end of 2015,
however, more than a year after the completion of the research,
hence it is unlikely that they affected the results.
In Cameroon, what explains the success of REDD+ in reducing
tenure insecurity, notably on household agricultural lands?
At the two Cameroon sites, the success of REDD+ in reducing
tenure insecurity could be a result of the positive engagement of
proponent organizations with local stakeholders. At the Mount
Cameroon project, a protected area that encompasses Mount
Cameroon National Park, a remnant of the Bomboko Forest Reserve
and a leakage belt (Awono, Tambe et al., 2014), villagers are
involved in a management committee which serves as a platform
for discussion and planning of project activities, including reducing
contestation over the ownership and access rights and ambiguity in
forest land use. The boundaries between community lands and the
Mount Cameroon National Park have been traced with the partici-
pation of the population. Community farmland recognized through
the process was extended in some villages. More importantly,
community members patrolled against illegal activities in the park,
receiving in exchange a bonus payment when illegal activities were
reported to the proponent (Awono, Tambe et al., 2014: 194). Even
though villagers do not have official rights to their land, the
collaborative management structure and conservation incentives21 See, for example, an article in The Guardian reporting on the case, at https://www
theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/09/illegal-loggers-blamed-for-of-peru-forest-cam-
paigner. Articles also appeared in Al Jazeera, BBC News, National Geographic, the
Huffington Post, and others..(which give local people a feeling of ownership) enabled the
population to feel more secure. At the South East Cameroon site,
not only have community projects been implemented, but
conditional payments have begun, enhancing participant apprecia-
tion for the PES project. Villagers in Nkolenyeng and Nomedjoh
have a community forest project, which by Cameroonian law
entitles them to extract and sell timber resources. Payments to
the community for carbon sequestration after it has renounced
timber extraction at the South East Cameroon site has raised hopes
that there would be positive impact on local livelihoods, even
though it is not clear how long the payments will last. Most
importantly at the South East Cameroon site, project activities
and the distribution of PES benefits were decided through a partic-
ipatory approach (Awono, Barreau, & Owona, 2014: 207–208, 216).
Although both projects have experienced towering challenges,
they provide evidence that the participatory approach may be
key to stakeholder engagement and satisfaction (Awono,
Somorin, Eba’a Atyi, & Levang, 2014). The South East Cameroon
case supports the point made by Karsenty and Assembé (2011)
that successful REDD+ in Central Africa will require tenure clarifi-
cation accompanied by an effective compensation system. Why
does tenure security worsen in control villages? It is in part
because some control villages are adjacent to the Dja Wildlife
Reserve and the Mengame Gorilla Sanctuary at the South East
Cameroon site, where stringent controls were imposed to stop ille-
gal activities, including the bushmeat trade.
What explains the high rate of tenure security in Tanzania
(compared to the other countries)?
At the Tanzania sites, the high rate of tenure security can be
explained largely by tenure and land management conditions that
predate REDD+, rather than REDD+ itself. Existing customary land
rights are strong enough to provide security in many areas of the
country. In 1999 the Village Land Act endowed more than 10,000
Village Councils with authority as land managers, and in the pro-
cess acknowledged customary land rights are equivalent to rights
secured through statutory channels (Alden Wily, 2001; Alden
Wily, 2007: 27-28, 277). The Forest Act of 2002 gave Village Coun-
cils the authority to set aside forest areas as community-owned
and managed Village Forest Reserves (Alden Wily, 2007: 27-28,
277). The Forest Act made it abundantly clear that ‘‘community
forests are the spearhead of forest management, not a token add-
on” (Alden Wily, 2007: 240). Among the countries that have pio-
neered devolution of forest ownership and management in Africa,
Tanzania is the most advanced (AldenWily, 2007: 277). This is true
in spite of the fact that the formalization of village ownership is
proceeding much slower than the statistics say (Lund, Sungusia,
Mabele, & Scheba, 2017). The Land Act (different from the Village
Land Act and also enacted in 1999) poses a challenge for the imple-
mentation of REDD+ because it enables the government to with-
draw ‘‘surplus” (not yet registered) lands from villages (Vice
President’s Office, 2013: 30). There are cases of large land acquisi-
tions in Tanzania in recent years (e.g. Purdon, 2013) that might
threaten land tenure security, but they have not happened in the
vicinity of the research sites.
In Indonesia, how do we explain that perceived tenure insecu-
rity has been reduced in both control and intervention villages,
and that REDD+ has had no effect in this process, even though
there are no tenure-related interventions in control villages?
First, in East Kalimantan, perceived tenure security has
improved in both control and intervention areas because villagers
were advised by the local forestry staff that their control of man-
aged or planted lands will not be challenged even though they
are located in the Forest Zone (Kawasan Hutan). Importantly, this
was not recorded as an ‘‘intervention” because it was simply a pol-
icy clarification, yet it may have influenced perceptions of tenure
security. Because control is recognized by proof of active land
388 W.D. Sunderlin et al. /World Development 106 (2018) 376–392management, perception of security of tenure (both in control and
intervention areas) can be enhanced by planting fallow and idle
lands with tree crops (e.g., rubber and even oil palm). Second, most
threats to perceived tenure insecurity come from outside the vil-
lage, either migrants originating from other areas or large compa-
nies. In Phase 2, respondents in both control and intervention
villages perceived few threats to tenure security from within the
village and from the neighboring villages. Moreover, rights are rec-
ognized or governed by customary law, and people from neighbor-
ing villages tend to understand and respect customary laws, and
are more aware of village boundaries. Hence, neighboring villagers
are less of a problem than people from other areas who lack under-
standing and recognition of local custom and boundaries. Third, at
least in some of our study areas, external actors such as oil palm
and timber companies appear to have improved their engagement
with local stakeholders, realizing that they need to do this to be
able to continue with their activities. Importantly, communities
are getting better and more proactive at negotiating with compa-
nies, both in control and intervention villages where they are
affected. Fourth, in some villages (both control and intervention)
a portion of the community prefers oil palm over REDD+, therefore
diminishing (to them) the tenure challenge posed by the external
claim. In this regard, REDD+ interventions have had relatively little
influence on perceived tenure security.
Across all five country cases, four insights can be derived from
the country-specific information supplied above. The first lesson
is analytic and comparative, and the other three are in the realm
of policy and implementation.
First, in comparing the five country cases, we reach the conclu-
sion that respondent perception of tenure security is heavily con-
ditioned by the context at the starting point and level of
expectations. At one extreme, in Brazil, the perception of low and
worsening tenure security is shaped by the reality of extreme
and violent contestation and conflict across the country, and some
REDD+ initiatives being located in places where these negative ten-
dencies are elevated, placing high hurdles in the way of achieve-
ment. While efforts to link environmental compliance with
tenure regularization at REDD+ sites held promise (Duchelle
et al., 2014), the challenges of addressing decades-long land con-
flicts amidst the bureaucracy of titling land in the Brazilian Ama-
zon are immense. While top-down command-and-control
interventions (i.e. most of the RFAC interventions at our Brazilian
study sites) have been linked to Brazil’s recent success in reducing
Amazonian deforestation (Assunção, Gandour, & Rocha, 2012), a
clear negative effect of these interventions on households’ per-
ceived well-being has been documented (Duchelle et al., 2017).
Tanzania, at the other extreme, is a country where tenure contes-
tation and conflict tends to be relatively low, not just because of
a relative absence of competition for land, but because of a legal
and customary framework that has already provided a compara-
tively high level of security. In contrast to the situation in Brazil,
land rights have already been delivered at a satisfactory level
before REDD+ interventions began. Under these conditions, expec-
tations began low, and they were easily exceeded when interven-
tions began to deliver supplementary benefits. The other country
cases lie between these extremes. In Peru, the starting point with
regard to insecurity was somewhat similar to Brazil, with a com-
mon history of violence, including murders of environmental and
land rights activists in the past decade (Global Witness, 2014).
But there was little expectation with regard to REDD+ after a
decade of virtual inaction on indigenous and community land
tenure rights and a conception of REDD+ strongly clouded by the
carbon cowboy rumors. In Cameroon, there is a moderate amount
of land contestation, and historically, low expectations of what thegovernment has to offer and deliver in the way of rights and
livelihoods. So two projects that deliver improved tenure security
and livelihood benefits can not only meet an urgent need, but
can also exceed low expectations. In Indonesia, there is a high level
of land contestation and, as in Cameroon, a historically jaded
outlook towards the national government on the issue of land
rights.
Second, national-level forest tenure reform and/or action are an
indispensable framework for achieving early, effective, and lasting
increases in tenure security. This conclusion is ironic given the
increase in tenure insecurity seen in Brazil (where national action
on tenure reform is high), and the decrease in tenure insecurity in
Cameroon (where national action on tenure is low). Nevertheless,
we affirm this point recognizing that the diverging outcomes in
Brazil and Cameroon are made relative rather than absolute by
the conditioning factors of starting point and expectation. At least
in theory, and probably in practice, it remains the case that in clar-
ifying tenure, proponents are attempting to change circumstances
the origin and scope of which lie far beyond their borders at the
national level, so it is appropriate for the scale of the intervention
to match the scale of the problem. Results over the next few years
in Peru, as massive titling projects begin to bear fruit, will provide
more insights on this issue.
Third, building on this last point, we affirm that it makes sense
for proponents and government to collaborate on tenure clarifica-
tion efforts. As pointed out earlier, proponents (together with local
stakeholders) have the interest and local-level knowledge neces-
sary to clarify tenure, and government actors have the leverage –
provided that they can be freed of control by countervailing BAU
interests. As above, we affirm this point in spite of the Brazil out-
come. We also point to the Indonesia case as an example where
proponents potentially benefit from the national One Map policy,
even if proponent collaboration with government was minimal
or non-existent.
Fourth, the Cameroon experience instructs us that an authenti-
cally participatory approach that delivers tangible early benefits
can be a key to achieving success in reducing tenure insecurity
for local stakeholders.
This section has helped identify some of the strengths and lim-
itations of the BACI approach in evaluating the impact of conserva-
tion and development programs. On the one hand it is useful in
measuring whether change has happened between control and
intervention, even at short intervals, but on the other hand it runs
up against its limitations in trying to understand why and how
change takes place. As pointed out by Scriven (2008: 18, 20), the
net effects of development programs tend to be smaller, less
immediate, and less obvious, and the ‘‘gold standard” for causal
claims is critical observation. And as observed by Westhorp
(2014), context makes a big difference to program outcomes.5. Conclusion
In this article, we have presented empirical evidence that early
REDD+ initiatives have not (overall) made significant progress
toward reducing tenure insecurity, in spite of the paramount
importance of tenure to the REDD+ agenda, and the large amount
of effort proponents have invested in it. We can only attribute
improvements in tenure security to REDD+ at the sites studied in
Cameroon (question 1). Although REDD+ was the top reason for
increased tenure security where improvement was recorded and
did not figure prominently among the reasons for increased tenure
insecurity (question 2), and although there was a net positive view
of the effect of REDD+ tenure-related interventions on community
well-being in three of the five study countries (question 3), REDD+
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preparedness.
In the discussion we mentioned three key approaches and poli-
cies necessary to turn the tide and undergird a successful effort to
build an appropriate tenure foundation: national-level action on
tenure; integration of proponent efforts to those national actions;
and an authentically participatory approach to local stakeholders
together with a system of rewards for foregone forest clearing.
As we look to the future, some might argue that the historical
moment for tenure and REDD+ has passed. After all, some of the
effort toward making tenure clearer and more secure was mobi-
lized in anticipation of a revenue stream from the forest carbon
market that has barely materialized, and public funding in support
of REDD+ is not a long-term proposition.
But that argument would be erroneous. As mentioned earlier,
the Paris Agreement is in the process of reviving attention to
REDD+. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the reasons proponents
give attention to tenure go beyond preparation for a revenue
stream to other matters. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, there
is an urgent need to address tenure in all forms of climate change
mitigation, whether forest-based or not. So even if an initiative
diversifies away from REDD+, tenure remains a high priority. This
reality is pertinent to our own sample of cases. Of the 21 initiatives,
five no longer operate, and of the 16 that continue, 12 continue to
use the ‘‘REDD+” label and four do not. That fact notwithstanding,
all 16 initiatives continue to work towards forest-based climate
change mitigation at their locations, and all continue to work on
tenure.
In closing, we wish to emphasize the importance of one more
national-level action that has a high bearing on the achievement
of the other three: successfully restraining the BAU interests that
continue to have the upper hand in tropical land use decisions.
As suggested in the reasons given for tenure insecurity, the role
played by companies and by governments is central, and con-
certed efforts by civil society may be needed to bring aboutAnnex 1
CIFOR GCS case study initiatives by study design, number of sample villages and househo
Study
design
Country Initiative
Abbreviation
Phase 1 (2010–2012)
Intervention Control Tota
villa
Villages Households Villages Households
Household Brazil Acre 4 127 4 117 8
Cotriguaçu 4 122 4 121 8
Jari/Amapá 5 122 0 0 5
SFX 4 124 4 122 8
Transamazon 4 137 4 126 8
Peru Madre de
Dios
4 126 4 124 8
Ucayali 4 123 4 124 8
Cameroon Mt.
Cameroon
4 160 3 90 7
SE Cameroon 2 120 4 160 6
Tanzania Kilosa 3 90 3 90 6
Shinyanga 4 120 5 150 9
Indonesia Katingan 4 133 4 132 8
KCCP 4 132 4 132 8
KFCP 4 131 4 130 8
TNC within
BFCP
5 163 4 132 9
Ulu Masen 4 132 4 132 8
SUBTOTAL 63 2062 59 1882 122
Village Tanzania Kigoma 4 4
Lindi 4 4
Mpingo 4 4
Zanzibar 4 4
Indonesia Rimba Raya 4 4
SUBTOTAL 20 20
TOTAL 83 2062 59 1882 142change.
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Phase 2 (2013–2014)
l
ges
Total
Households
Intervention Control Total
villages
Total
Households
Villages Households Villages Households
244 4 116 4 98 8 214
243 4 123 4 105 8 228
122 5 120 0 0 5 120
246 4 123 4 120 8 243
263 4 124 4 120 8 244
250 4 126 4 125 8 251
247 4 123 4 121 8 244
250 4 144 3 80 7 224
280 2 110 4 140 6 250
180 3 89 2 50 5 139
270 4 117 5 140 9 257
265 4 133 4 132 8 265
264 4 135 4 135 8 270
261 4 118 4 125 8 243
295 5 156 4 135 9 291
264 4 139 4 132 8 271
3944 63 1996 58 1758 121 3754
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
20 20
3944 83 1996 58 1758 141 3754
Annex 2
Perceived change in tenure security with respect to village land areas: higher, no change, or lower. Comparison of REDD+ intervention villages and controls, Phase 2 (2013–2014)
results.
Country Number and percent of village land areas where perceived tenure security is...
Higher No change Lower
N Percent N Percent N Percent
Brazil 6 of 54 11.1% 37 of 54 68.5% 11 of 54 20.4%
Intervention 1 of 26 3.8% 18 of 26 69.2% 7 of 26 26.9%
Control 5 of 28 17.9% 19 of 28 67.9% 4 of 28 14.3%
Peru 2 of 37 5.4% 18 of 37 48.6% 15 of 35 42.9%
Intervention 2 of 19 10.5% 9 of 19 47.4% 7 of 18 38.9%
Control 0 of 18 0.0% 9 of 18 50.0% 8 of 17 47.1%
Cameroon 8 of 42 19.0% 22 of 42 54.2% 12 of 42 28.6%
Intervention 3 of 17 17.6% 9 of 17 52.9% 5 of 17 29.4%
Control 5 of 25 20.0% 13 of 25 52.0% 7 of 25 28.0%
Tanzania 12 of 58 20.7% 39 of 58 67.2% 7 of 58 12.1%
Intervention 10 of 44 22.7% 29 of 44 65.9% 5 of 44 11.4%
Control 2 of 14 14.3% 10 of 14 71.4% 2 of 14 14.3%
Indonesia 20 of 199 10.1% 142 of 199 71.4% 37 of 199 18.6%
Intervention 20 of 116 17.2% 81 of 116 69.8% 15 of 116 12.9%
Control 0 of 83 0.0% 61 of 83 73.5% 22 of 83 26.5%
TOTAL 48 of 390 12.3% 258 of 390 66.2% 82 of 388 21.1%
Intervention 36 of 222 16.2% 146 of 222 65.8% 39 of 221 17.6%
Control 12 of 168 7.1% 112 of 168 66.7% 43 of 167 25.7%
Annex 3
Perceived effect of tenure-related interventions (RFAC, TC) on well-being of intervention households, Phase 2. Number and percent of evaluations of tenure interventions at
household level.
Country Effect of tenure intervention on household well-being RFAC TC Total
N Percent N Percent N Percent
Brazil Total 442 100.0% 286 100.0% 728 100.0%
Negative 129 29.2% 42 14.7% 171 23.5%
Neutral 166 37.6% 140 49.0% 306 42.0%
Positive 147 33.3% 104 36.4% 251 34.5%
Peru Total 146 100.0% 69 100.0% 215 100.0%
Negative 45 30.8% 5 7.2% 50 23.3%
Neutral 32 21.9% 19 27.5% 51 23.7%
Positive 69 47.3% 45 65.2% 114 53.0%
Cameroon Total 120 100.0% 87 100.0% 207 100.0%
Negative 19 15.8% 8 9.2% 27 13.0%
Neutral 39 32.5% 18 20.7% 57 27.5%
Positive 62 51.7% 61 70.1% 123 59.4%
Tanzania Total 71 100.0% 9 100.0% 80 100.0%
Negative 1 1.4% 0 0.0% 1 1.3%
Neutral 10 14.1% 1 11.1% 11 13.8%
Positive 60 84.5% 8 88.9% 68 85.0%
Indonesia Total 77 100.0% 46 100.0% 123 100.0%
Negative 2 2.6% 0 0.0% 2 1.6%
Neutral 37 48.1% 18 39.1% 55 44.7%
Positive 38 49.4% 28 60.9% 66 53.7%
All Total 856 100.0% 497 100.0% 1353 100.0%
Negative 196 22.9% 55 11.1% 251 18.6%
Neutral 284 33.2% 196 39.4% 480 35.5%
Positive 376 43.9% 246 49.5% 622 46.0%
Note: ‘‘RFAC” is restrictions on forest access and conversion” and ‘‘TC” is tenure clarification.
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